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Democracy, Not Deference:
An Egalitarian Theory of Judicial Review
BY RONALD C. DEN OTTER*
But the Constitution is aimed at everyone, not simply thejudges.'
Judicial review is a present instrument of government. It represents a
choice that men have made, and ultimately we must justify it as a choice
in our own time.
2
INTRODUCTION
A lexander Bickel once referred to judicial review as a "deviant
institution" in American democracy. This Article is about how we
can make judicial review less hostile to democratic decisionmaking,
thereby avoiding charges that it is inherently antidemocratic.4 At present,
we treat many of our most divisive issues of public morality as questions
of constitutional law and resolve them through judicial review.' As many
* Ph.D. Candidate, University of California, Los Angeles; A.B. 1989,
University of California, Davis; J.D. 1992, University of Pennsylvania Law
School; M.A. 1997, University of California, Los Angeles. I am grateful to Andy
Sabl, Adam Winkler, Scott Bowman, Andrew Lister, and Brian Walker, all of
whom read drafts of this Article. In particular, I would like to thank my wife, Dana
Donghong Yi. Without her support, this Article would not have been possible.
1 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 9 (1993) [hereinafter
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION].
2 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986).
3 Id. at 18.
' On the source of the power of judicial review, see Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also BICKEL, supra note 2, at 1-16; LEONARD
LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1967); William Van Alstyne,
A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-29.
' A large number of questions of constitutional law are moral questions, or at
least have significant moral dimensions. Many of them, such as abortion, surrogate
motherhood, the right to die, the appropriate separation between church and state,
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critics have pointed out, our increasing reliance on such review over time
cannot be easily squared with our commitment to democracy.6 When we
take such questions out of the hands of the electorate, we put considerable
faith in judges to make wise moral decisions for us. At the very least, such
decisionmaking by courts places some doubt into the claim that citizens are
actually ruling themselves.
Nevertheless, constitutional law scholars have rarely contested the
concept of judicial review.7 Those who endorse most of its results have
offered a variety of sophisticated theories that attempt to show that judicial
review is not so deyiant after all.' For instance, John Hart Ely introduces
a theory of "representation reinforcement," in which judicial review
corrects the failures of the political market.9 Samuel Freeman defends
judicial review on the grounds that it furthers democratic sovereignty.1 °
Michael Perry offers a "functional justification" of noninterpretive judicial
review on human rights issues that he alleges to be consistent with
affirmative action, capital punishment, and gay and lesbian marriage, are topics that
moral philosophers. routinely address. By "public morality," I mean political
morality that governs the mutual relations of people who live together in the same
political community. Collective decisions about this kind of morality must be
justified because public laws are backed by the coercive power of the state. In this
Article, I focus exclusively on fundamental political questions that involve moral
disputes. My critique of judicial review is not meant to extend beyond these sorts
of questions into more technical areas of constitutional law.
6 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 317-30 (1996); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERA-
TION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 6 (1980); H.L.A Hart, American
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 125 (1983); SIDNEY HOOK, THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM 95 (1962).
7 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY
THE JUDICIARY 11 (1982); cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT, at x-xi (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME] (discussing widespread agreement on basic values in the
constitutional culture).
8 See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-33
(1991) (arguing that a theory of "dualist democracy" can reconcile the tension
between higher constitutional values and ordinary lawmaking).
9 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
10 See Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of
Judicial Review, 9 LAW & PHIL. 327 (1990-1991).
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democratic policymaking." Others, notably Ronald Dworkin, insist that
judges must make value judgments beyond those specified by the framers
to ensure political equality.12 These theorists, who champion activist forms
of judicial review, share the belief that, in comparison with the two other
branches of government, courts are better suited to serve as forums of
principle.'3 As such, they assume that judges can make difficult choices
about public morality that are too important to be left to normal democratic
processes. 14
This Article contends that we should not rely so heavily on the
judiciary to settle our moral conflicts, although not for the typical reasons
mustered by democratic critics of judicial review. 5 We have not openly
confronted this problem of taking the Constitution away from the people
because the debate over the proper scope of judicial review has been
"See PERRY, supra note 7, at 91-145.
12 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986).
13 See BICKEL, supra note 2, at 25; PERRY, supra note 7, at 15-16; cf Owen M.
Fiss, Objectivity andInterpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739,755 (1982) (suggesting
that judges must operate under stricter procedural constraints than those of the
other branches); Abner J. Mivka, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend
the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587 (1983) (arguing that Congress lacks
political incentives and the institutional capacity to evaluate the constitutionality
of pending legislation).
'" See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-30 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW]
(arguing that constitutional interpretation requires moral judgment on the part of
the judge).
'" The standard challenge, particularly aimed at non-originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation, is that unelected judges are not directly accountable
to the electorate, and as such, should not have the power to decide questions of
national importance that are not explicitly covered by the Constitution. Ackerman
refers to this general school of thought as "monistic" democracy and likens it to
British parliamentary practice. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 7-8. However, very
few of those who favor non-originalist or noninterpretivist theories of judicial
review openly claim that judges ought to apply values not found in the constitu-
tional text nor implied by it. But see Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703-17 (1975). The real issue is not whether
judges should be interpreting the Constitution, but rather what constitutes a
reasonable interpretation of the text or, strictly speaking, what constitutes a
reasonable application of a constitutional provision to a concrete set of facts. As
such, the term "non-interpretivism," which is used to describe theories of
constitutional interpretation that purportedly go beyond plain meaning and original
understanding, is misleading in that it suggests that a judge is not interpreting the
text but is doing something else.
2002-20031
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framed too narrowly, leaving us with two undesirable extremes. 6 On the
one hand, those who defend the exercise ofjudicial review call attention to
the need for those with special competence to assess legislation that is
constitutionally suspect. Undemocratic means, they insist, may be entirely
appropriate to protect the substantive values that make the operation of
constitutional democracy possible. 7 After all, ordinary citizens may not be
sufficiently aware of the constitutional and moral implications of their
collective decisions. In such instances, judges must have veto power over
popular choices to control the vagaries of democratic politics, thereby
saving the people from themselves. On the other hand, those who seek to
restrict the reach of judicial review in the name of democracy, such as
Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, and William Rehnquist, contend that the
people or their elected representatives should decide the vast majority of
questions concerning public morality.'8 They point out that an activist
approach to constitutional interpretation ultimately rests on an elitist
rationale: that ordinary citizens cannot be expected to exercise political
power responsibly. 9
These two standpoints---that we should defer to either the whims of
transient majorities or to the expertise ofjudges--are equally problematic."
"6 Cf. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 6 (1992) (claiming
that the "debate [over judicial review] has been conducted within the framework
of the Hamiltonian conception of judicial supremacy"). The alternative to judicial
supremacy is widely believed to be some kind of popular sovereignty, that is,
deference to the wishes of the majority. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
" See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 1-24
(1987).
" Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution,
in Will E. Orgain Lecture (Mar. 12, 1976), 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 (1976); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, in William Howard Taft Constitutional Law
Lecture (Sept. 16, 1988), 57 CNN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
9 Cf Bork, supra note 18, at 10 ("Where the Constitution does not embody the
moral or ethical choice, the judge has no basis other than his own values upon
which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the statute."); see
generally ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 45 (1998) (claiming that "heads of
nondemocratic regimes have usually tried to justify their rule by invoking the
ancient and persistent claim that most people are just not competent" to govern
themselves).
20 Scholarship provides a number of different rationales for judicial review. For
a rational choice perspective, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES
IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 93 (2d ed. 1984). For a Madisonian
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Both ultimately fail because they produce either democratically illegitimate
or morally objectionable outcomes. For the most part, those who favor a
more active role for the judiciary have not been sufficiently concerned with
democratically illegitimate outcomes. Many of them are convinced that
only judges can be trusted to make principled decisions in the long-term
interests of a constitutional democracy.2 The romantic tale about judges
who can be counted on to rise above partisanship, however, does not
diminish the fact that we have delegated extraordinary political authority
to the judiciary. Two of the obvious problems with this sort of deference
to judges are that we cannot take for granted their wisdom or their
integrity.22 The "forum of principle" thesis would seem to require a leap of
faith on our part, because nothing guarantees that the exercise of judicial
review by real judges will protect constitutional essentials.23 As one
commentator notes, an independent judiciary may replace "one set of
tyrants with another. 24 Judicial tyranny is far more serious than that of the
other branches of government because federal judges lack direct electoral
accountability.25 Furthermore, changes in the composition of the judiciary
make it difficult to predict whether its future members will have the right
attitude toward constitutional adjudication.
The central premise of this Article is that this debate over the legiti-
macy ofjudicial review and its proper scope rests on a false choice between
justification, see STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY
OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134-77 (1995); Jonathan Riley, American Democracy
and Majority Rule, in MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 267-307 (John W. Chapman &
Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990). From a more Rawlsian standpoint, see Freeman,
supra note 10. For a procedural or "representation-reinforcing" justification, see
ELY, supra note 9.
21 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR
POLITICS? 106-10 (1994). But see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 123-24 (1996).22 While the claim that law is politics by another name is far too crude, critical
legal theorists were right to point out that many important judicial decisions are
easier to explain on partisan grounds than on legal grounds. This skeptical
challenge to the integrity of the law lies at the heart of the American legal realist
movement of the 1920s and 1930s as well. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING, at xiv (1985).
23 The Author borrows the term"forum of principle" from Ronald Dworkin. See
RONALD DwORK-N, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985).
24 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1990).
25 But see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV.
577, 617-27 (1993).
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what Mark Tushnet has called "two dictatorships."26 In other words, the
means of resolving our most fundamental political questions need not be
too democratic nor too elitist. This Article puts forth a third alternative: that
over time, citizens could learn to perform the role that judges currently play
in constraining democratic decisionmaking. The current practice ofjudicial
review undermines democratic self-rule to the extent that judges assume the
role of experts on fundamental political questions and thereby deprive
citizens of the opportunity to cultivate their civic capacities.27 If citizens
could learn to respect constitutional essentials and vote accordingly, then
one of the strongest rationales for judicial review would disappear. This
Article argues that judicial review can become more democratic without
sacrificing important constitutional values, provided that citizens can
incorporate such considerations into their voting decisions. In making this
case, I shall use John Rawls' conception of public reason as a model for
such voting and demonstrate how its resultant constraints parallel those of
principled constitutional adjudication.2" As such, the "constitutional" and
"democracy" parts of constitutional democracy can theoretically be brought
together.
This Article will be divided into three main sections: Part I will
describe the shortcomings of the two main approaches to judicial review
and show why scholarly literature on the topic forces us into an either/or
that prevents us from looking into other more democratic possibilities.29
Part II shall spell out in detail how the practice of Rawlsian public reason
by ordinary citizens could constrain voting on constitutional essentials to
produce democratically legitimate and morally acceptable outcomes.30 Part
26 MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16 (1988).
27 John Stuart Mill conceived of democratic politics as a mechanism of self-
development and civic education for all citizens. See JOHN DUNN, WESTERN
POLITICAL THEORY IN THE FACE OF THE FUTURE 51-53 (1979); see also DENNIS F.
THOMPSON, JOHN STUART MILL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1976).
28 Rawls himself does not see his idea of public reason as a proxy for judicial
review of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. For his most recent
views regarding judicial review, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 233-40
(1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. For his original theory of
public reason, see id. at 212-54. For Rawls' more recent views on public reason,
see JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 89-94 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS]; John Rawls, The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 131 (1999) [hereinafter Rawls, Public
Reason Revisited].
29 See infra notes 32-146 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 147-88 and accompanying text.
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I will develop an analogy between citizens and judges to explain how the
kind of voting that Rawlsian citizenship requires could. serve as a more
egalitarian stand-in for judicial review.3'
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. A Brief History
This section will outline the main difficulties of originalist (interpre-
tive) and non-originalist (noninterpretive) attitudes toward judicial review
to show how current scholarship on the topic has pushed us into the
awkward position of having to choose between two undesirable alterna-
tives. 32 Legal scholars may move beyond this false dichotomy between
democracy without constitutional values and constitutional values without
democracy, provided that we are willing to entertain the possibility that
citizens could take a more active part in resolving constitutional controver-
sies. Indeed, the main point of this Article is that scholars who are so eager
to embrace judicial supremacy because they endorse, on moral grounds,
most of the major decisions of the United States Supreme Court after 1954,
ought to be less enthusiastic about using the federal judiciary in this
manner.33 A society in which voters incorporate constitutional consider-
ations into their voting decisions is a society that is, so to speak, beyond
31 See infra notes 189-213 and accompanying text.
32 The distinction between "interpretive" and "noninterpretive" theories of
constitutional interpretation provided the central theoretical framework for
scholarly discourse in the 1980s. See, e.g., Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in
the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 746 (1983). Interpretive
theories require close readings of the text and careful attention to original intent or
original understanding, whereas noninterpretive theories extend beyond the text,
original intent, and original understanding to values that lie outside of the
Constitution itself. See Grey, supra note 15, at 706. For a basic account of the
differences between interpretive and noninterpretive review, see PERRY, supra note
7, at 6-11. For a critique of this distinction, see Lawrence B. Solun, Michael L.
Perry's Morality, Politics, and Law: Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63
TuL. L. REV. 1599 (1989).
3' For an argument that principled legal reasoning amounts to "transcend[ing]
... immediate result[s,]" see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959). The obvious problem with
Wechsler's definition is that it is too deontological. Any theory of constitutional
adjudication must be sensitive to various consequences. Still, Wechsler is correct
to single out the importance of not reducing legal reasoning to a pure form of
consequentialist reasoning.
2002-2003]
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judicial review.34 As an alternative to reliance on judges, then, my aim is
to formulate a conception of democratic citizenship that models how voters
could cast their ballots to respect the freedom and equality of their fellow
citizens.
I believe two fundamental questions underlie the controversy surround-
ing the exercise of judicial review. First, who should have the political
authority to decide the most important political questions? Second, how
should these decisions be regulated, if at all, to preclude morally objection-
able results? For many commentators, the obvious answer to the first
question is judges.35 The vast majority of constitutional law scholars
believe the Constitution places some political issues outside the reach of
simple majorities and that the courts are more institutionally capable of
protecting higher law than are the other branches of government.36 At the
same time, this answer has generated considerable controversy because it
is far from obvious how judges can be prevented from doing what they like.
Unlike elected officials, we cannot vote federal judges out of office, and
members of Congress cannot easily remove them for impeachable
offenses."
This problem of judges' lack of direct electoral accountability is
complicated by the fact that many of us disagree about what kinds of
constitutional interpretations are plausible in the first place. It is not clear,
for example, what it means to "misinterpret" constitutional clauses that
provide little interpretive guidance. After all, there is no consensus on how
the Constitution ought to be read, and the history of the founding period is
not terribly helpful on this question.38 Nor is it clear when a judge has
3' By "constitutional considerations," I mean more than mere constitutional
values specified in the constitutional text or in the case law that has interpreted it
over time. I also include public reasons that go beyond what Sunstein refers to as
"naked preferences." Sunstein maintains that the Constitution prohibits such
preferences from being used to justify the allocation of a disproportionate share of
resources to politically powerful groups without reference to some public value.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1689 (1984).
35 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 95-105. But see LEARNED HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958, at 73 (1958)
("For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.").
36 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204, 238 (1988) (arguing that an active role for the judiciary has
"dominated modem American constitutional theory and practice").
31 See PERRY, supra note 7, at 9-10.
38 There is a continuing scholarly dispute as to whether constitutional inter-
pretation should resemble statutory or common law interpretation. See, e.g., PAUL
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improperly read his or her own value choices into the constitutional text in
rendering an illegitimate decision. In fact, reliance on such values may be
unavoidable.3 ' The abstract nature of many constitutional provisions,
furthermore, means that hard questions of constitutional law do not yield
self-evident answers.4 ° For this reason, it may be difficult to determine
from a written opinion alone whether a judge has abused his or her
authority.
41
Controversy over the role courts should play in our political system is
not new.42 Unfortunately, American history does not illuminate how much
decisionmaking authority, if any, ought to be delegated to the courts. We
do not know whether the framers had a theory of judicial review or, if they
had such a theory, whether they intended that the courts alone would
review laws' constitutionality.43 As Stephen M. Griffin points out, the
modem system of judicial review did not exist in the late eighteenth
century, and thus, the framers had no chance to evaluate the institution as
it currently exists." Nor did they distinguish among the different types of
judicial power.45 In fact, some scholars have questioned whether the
Constitution itself authorizes such review.46
The modem controversy over the role of the federal courts accompa-
nied the growth of the national state in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.47 The decisions of the Lochner" era engendered the
W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL THEORY 68-77 (1992); HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 77-88
(1990).
3 9 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 117 (1977) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
40 DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 14, at 7.
41 See generally Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 151 (1981). But see Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional
Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 809-12, 824-31 (1982) (on the constraining
effects of constitutional language).
42 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 1.
43 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
POLITICAL PROCESS 48 (1988).
"See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 91.451Id. at 107.
'For an affirmative answer, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 351-62 (1977).
47 See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 90, 99.
48 Lockner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a maximum hour
work week statute on substantive Due Process grounds).
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modem debate over judicial review.49 After 1954, many constitutional law
scholars labored to establish the legitimacy of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.5" They sought to demonstrate, in other words, that Brown was law, not
just politics. At the same time, those scholars also recognized that the kind
of judicial activism that had characterized the Lochner era should not be
resurrected.5 In the early 1970s, liberals felt compelled to defend the
activist record of the Warren Court52 by developing theories of judicial
review that would justify its most controversial decisions." After 1973, Roe
v. Wade54 produced the scholarship that characterized contemporary
constitutional theory and drove scholars into opposing camps.
55
There is no shortage of critics who allege that the Warren Court and the
early Burger Court56 abused their authority by basing their most controver-
sial decisions in the justices' own substantive value choices.57 This critique
is premised on the thesis that constitutional interpretations not conforming
to the plain meaning of the constitutional text or to authoritative external
sources, such as original understanding, amount to a usurpation of political
power.58 The practice ofjudicial review can be legitimate, they insist, only
when neutral principles rooted in these two sources strictly constrain the
49 See WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND
LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 49-69 (1994).50 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the segregation of
schools based on race, even when facilities are equal, violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
51 See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 141.
52 The Warren Court was criticized for its allegedly activist decisions, parti-
ularly in the area of constitutional criminal procedure.
53 See TUSHNET, supra note 26, at vii.
54 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the right to an abortion as
constitutionally protected in some instances).
55 See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 142.
56 The early Burger Court was criticized for allegedly activist decisions such as
Roe. See Albert W. Alschuler, FailedPragmatism on the Burger Court, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1436, 1449 (1987).
57 See, e.g., Edwin Meese, III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1990).
58 For an overview of various forms of originalism, see GREGORY BASSHAM,
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1992). See
also Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem-The Role of the Intent
of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REV. 811 (1983).
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interpretive discretion of a judge. 9 In particular, originalists maintain that
their theory of constitutional interpretation is the most legitimate interpre-
tive technique because it provides at least some protection against abuse of
judicial authority.6"
The division between originalists and non-originalists over how strictly
such authority should be constrained, however, distracts us from noticing
the deeper consensus that exists regarding the institution ofjudicial review
itself. Those who loudly denounce the liberal activism of the Warren Court
as a usurpation of the political authority of Congress and state legislatures
seek only to restrict the scope of judicial review. Its exercise will be
consistent with democratic self-rule, they concede, as long as judges
interpret constitutional provisions appropriately--that is, acting as judges
and not as legislators. For them, the main difficulty is that judges are
tempted to reach results that can only be justified on extraconstitutional
grounds. If judicial decisionmaking were more mechanical, then the
exercise of judicial review would not be problematic.6" The theoretical
disagreement between originalists and non-originalists is about its proper
scope in a democracy. Even the most fanatical originalists do not believe
that Marbury v. Madison62 should be overturned.
Herein lies the rub. There is too much consensus on the institution of
judicial review. Scholarly disagreement is almost entirely focused on how
judges should read the Constitution, and not on whether they ought to be
reading it in the first place. This preoccupation with, interpretive issues
prevents us from looking at the institution of judicial review more closely
and from examining other democratic possibilities that require more active
participation on the part of ordinary citizens. The expansive role of the
59 See Bork, supra note 18, at 6; cf. Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a
Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 61-75 (1981)
(advocating originalist position but less preoccupied with constraining judicial
decisionmaking).
60 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 132 (1997).
6' For example, for originalists, "obedience to original intent imposes an
essential constraint on judicial choice that constitutional language alone does not
provide." Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 445,446 (1984). Clear principles found in the Constitution provide the major
premise in a practical syllogism. When the judge formulates the minor premise
based on her understanding of the particular facts of the case, then the legal
conclusion is supposed to follow logically. As such, constitutional judgment can
be more deductive, thereby producing neutral, principled judgments.
62 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding the judicial
review is the provence of the judiciary).
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federal judiciary over the course of our history also contributes to our
inability to imagine constitutional scrutiny without judges.63 As some
commentators have noted, our fear of transferring additional political
power to the electorate reflects deep skepticism about whether unregulated
majority rule can protect the most important constitutional values.'
Indeed, the very structure of the federal government is predicated on
the weak assumption that even elite political actors can never be trusted to
police themselves. 65 If the wisdom of The Federalist Papers66 can be
reduced to one main insight about politics, it is that political power must be
dispersed throughout a number of government institutions, resulting in a
sort of balance of powers arrangement that ensures that one faction will not
grow too powerful and achieve hegemony over the other factions. That one
could rely on nobler motives is off the table. In Madison's famous words,
"Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm."67 At the same time,
constitutional law scholars are less likely to extend this sort of skepticism
about human nature to judges themselves. Their refusal to do so, however,
is undermined by the thoroughly political character of the appointment and
confirmation processes today.68 Robes do not magically transform a person
into a more principled human being with better judgment.69 In the past,
63 See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 59-87 (discussing the expansion of the
judiciary, the executive, and administrative agencies in the twentieth century).
"See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradictions ofNormative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1106
(1981).
65 The Madisonian conception of democracy appears to be premised on this
assumption. Madison claims that the latent causes of faction are ingrained in
human nature and that the only plausible remedy involves controlling their effects.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 54-57 (James Madison) (Great Minds Series ed.,
2000); see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY
175-77 (1990); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 38-39, 176-77
(1987). But see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 471-518 (1969) (emphasizing the "strictly republican" goals of the
Federalists).
66 THE FEDERALIST (Great Minds Series ed., 2000).
67 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 65, at 57.
6'But see GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 119-21 (comparing the American judiciary
with those of European countries and finding the American appointment and tenure
systems less politically influenced). There is an old joke that a judge is just a
lawyer who is friends with a governor. I owe this reference to David Karol.
69 For a particularly egregious example concerning Justice James McReynolds,
see JOHN KNOX, THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF
A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR'S WASHINGTON (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David
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ambiguous constitutional provisions, such as due process, have invited bad
faith from judges who sought to protect private property rights at the
expense of the expansion of the social welfare state.70
At minimum, one should not put forth a theory of judicial review
without explaining how judges could be discouraged from using such
review to advance a particular partisan agenda.' Yet scholars who are
sympathetic to more activist approaches to constitutional interpretation
have not adequately defended their belief that most judges can be trusted
to resist the temptation of letting their partisan preferences determine legal
outcomes. As we know from the past, judges can render poor decisions.
Notorious cases like Dred Scott v. Sandford72 Hammer v. Dagenhart," and
Lochner v. New York,74 for example, cannot be expunged from the
historical record. Those who have been pleased with the results ofjudicial
review on balance must come to terms with the contingency of these
positive outcomes. That the current Court could promote states' rights to
advance a conservative partisan agenda remains a real possibility.7
At least part of the explanation for courts' current prominence in our
political system is that the framers did not anticipate the rapid pace of
democratization over a relatively short period of time. It is well known that
the framers were hostile to mass political participation and never believed
that ordinary citizens would be (or would ever need to be) informed about
politics.76 However, the franchise was extended dramatically from 1787 to
1840.,7 Although the Electoral College was designed to be a deliberative
J. Garrow eds., 2002).
70 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7, I do not mean to suggest that all judges would be fully aware that they are
abusing their authority. I do not doubt that most, if not all, of the most ideological
judges sincerely think that they are living up to their professional duties. Therein
lies the trouble.
72 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (finding the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 to be unconstitutional).
73 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a child labor law).
74 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45 (invalidating a maximum hour work week statute).
751 am assuming that the Court's decisions will have a real impact on American
politics and society. But see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 229-46 (6th
ed. 1998); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 319-77 (5th ed. 2000); GERALDN. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993).
76 See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CIVIC LIFE 9 (1998).
77 See BURT, supra note 16, at 35.
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body, eighteen of twenty-four states held popular votes for the presidency
by 1824.78 In 1865, the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised African-
American males.79 In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment provided for the
direct election of United States Senators.80 In 1920, the Nineteenth
Amendment gave women the right to vote.8
Because of this unexpected democratization, one of the most difficult
challenges facing modem deliberative democratic theorists involves how
to encourage ordinary citizens to think seriously about political issues. The
inherent difficulty of reconciling popular participation with public
deliberation has generated widespread skepticism in American political
thought about the prospects of mass democracy. As a result, many political
thinkers with sincere democratic sympathies have also been reluctant
democrats in the sense that they expect certain constitutional arrangements
to limit the power of democratic majorities.82 They see judicial review as
a necessary safeguard against a democracy that makes too little room for
serious deliberation on important political questions. They are equally
unsure that a sufficient number of elected representatives would do any
better in terms of putting principled considerations above the desires of
their constituents. None of the empirical political science literature on
legislative behavior suggests that legislators are more likely than judges to
incorporate constitutional considerations into their decisionmaking.83
B. Madisonian Democracy
We might say that, over time, we have arrived at judicial review by a
process of elimination. Oddly enough, reliance on courts to correct
78 See JAMES S. FIsHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND
DEMOCRACY 66 (1995).
79 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.8 Id. amend. XVII.
81 Id. amend. XIX.
82While there are important differences among elite democratic theorists, all of
them believe that certain persons, in light of their political expertise, are more
qualified than others are to make important political decisions. See DENNIS F.
THOMPSON, THE DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 150-51 (1970).
83 Today, the "politicians just want to get elected" explanation of legislative
behavior is found in the majority of political science literature on the topic and
shows that public opinion constrains what elected officials may do during their
tenure in office. But see Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members
of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REv. 707 (1985).
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democratic excess is not obviously inconsistent with the general intent of
the framers to empower "deliberative majorities" at the expense of
"uninformed, immoderate, or passionate majorities." 4 In light of their elite
biases and distaste for direct democracy, if they had been clairvoyant, the
framers might have accepted the idea of having the federal judiciary play
a more active part in democratic decisionmaking at the national level. The
problem of democratic government, as Madison put it, is "[t]o secure the
public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a [majority]
faction, and at the same time preserve the spirit and the form of popular
government.. ."" The Madisonian solution was to refine public opinion
through informed and dispassionate reasoning about common concerns.8 6
The voice of the people must be "pronounced" by their representatives, he
tells us, so that it will be "more consonant to the public good" than that of
"the people themselves, convened for the purpose."" The purpose of
representation, strictly speaking, is not to represent but to mediate or, if
necessary, to maintain a balance of power among competing factions by
altering popular views.
Today, very few ofus would champion the kind of elitism that Madison
defends so openly in The Federalist. Nor is it evident that an extended
republic is any less prone to factions than smaller political units are. Most
democratic theorists have welcomed the movement toward mass democracy
in the United States as a step toward the actualization of political equality.
But they also fear that this movement has rendered election campaigns and
ordinary politics less deliberative, as citizens disagreeing on political issues
are less likely to justify their respective stances with sincere reasons.88 This
fear cuts against the democratic belief that citizens are supposed to be
treated as if they were equally qualified to participate in the process of
collective decisionmaking.8 9 In sum, one is hard-pressed to maintain that
American politics today is deliberative or participatory in any meaningful
84 See JOSEPH M. BESSETrE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 3 (1994).
85 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 65, at 55.
86 Madison writes that the purpose of republican (representative) government
is "to refine and enlarge public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations." Id at 59.
87 /d.
88 On the decline of discourse with the rise of a popular audience via the mass
media, see TULIS, supra note 65.
89 See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 19, at 37.
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sense. Voters seem to have little incentive to work through the facts,
arguments, and opposing arguments that underlie important political
questions or, even more basically, to gather information concerning them.9"
It seems almost inevitable, then, that the advent of mass democracy leads
to a trade-off between participation by ordinary people and the quality of
deliberation in the public sphere. If the citizenry and legislative bodies
cannot deliberate, then courts must fill the void. This Article posits that
more situations than we realize may be amenable to democratic correction
if we are willing to entertain the possibility that ordinary citizens can learn
to respect constitutional essentials.9 For too long, most commentators have
assumed that we cannot constrain democratic choices to protect such
essentials without relying on judges whose moral knowledge is alleged to
be superior to that of ordinary citizens. One of the main aims of this Article
is to challenge the assumption that teaching citizens to become better
judges of constitutional values is not an option. At the very least, I hope to
shift the burden of persuasion back to those who are incurably cynical
about the civic capacities of ordinary Americans. After all, majority rule
threatens constitutional values only when citizens are incapable of
incorporating such considerations into their voting decisions. Those who
cannot conceive of a better system tend to believe that the pure, principled
legal reasoning we expect from judges can be preserved only when we
maintain a high wall of separation between politics and law. The failure to
do so, it is widely believed, is bound to lead to unprincipled results. By
contrast, this Article suggests that we should try to put principle back into
democratic decisionmaking.
92
9o Political science literature on voting behavior suggests that voters do not have
incentives to digest large amounts of political information, to reach thoughtful
decisions, or to consider voting as a public matter. Citizens who do not perceive
voting to be a matter of principle or of civic duty have no rational motivation to pay
attention to such questions. The result is that the relatively minor inconveniences
of gathering information and going to the polls discourage large numbers of
citizens from fully participating in political life. Gathering information is costly and
often not worth acquiring given the infinitesimal probability that a single vote can
make a difference anyway. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY 36-50, 207-76 (1957).
91 But see STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 6-7 (1990).
92 Cf. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998) (showing
the absence of real deliberation on the part of the justices during the 1987 term).
[VOL. 91
DEMOCRACY, NOT DEFERENCE
C. Democracy
1. Democratic Critics of Judicial Review
The democratic critique ofjudicial review appeals to the popular notion
that democracy entails some deference to the wishes of the majority when
unanimous agreement on collective decisions is impossible. Democratic
critics ofjudicial review are less likely than those who defend more activist
approaches to believe that judges render more principled constitutional
judgments than other citizens. As a result, they insist that the scope of
judicial review must be restricted to ensure that the preferences of the
majority are respected unless the text of the Constitution unambiguously
addresses the issue at hand. They contend that, by entrusting the survival
of constitutional values to courts, we have in effect embraced an aristo-
cratic form of government that puts political power into the hands of
modem-day philosopher-kings. For many of these critics, the fact that there
are no right (or better) answers to fundamental political questions means
that these questions should be left to the will of the people as expressed
through their elected representatives. 9 The practice ofjudicial review, the
critics conclude, is often incompatible with democratic self-rule when
unelected judges can invalidate popular legislation for reasons without
democratic pedigree.
2. Alexander Bickel 's "Counter-majoritarian "Difficulty
Our skepticism toward the possibility of democratizing judicial review
can be partly traced to the influence of Alexander Bickel's legal scholar-
ship." Bickel believed that judicial review is a "counter-majoritarian force
in our system" when it is not exercised appropriately.95 In particular, he was
concerned that the finality of judicial review prevented an ordinary,
electorally accountable legislative majority from overturning the Court's
decisions.96 He began The Least Dangerous Branch by frankly admitting
93 Historically, judicial restraint has been associated with moral skepticism and
moral relativism. See ELY, supra note 9, at 57-59; see also Rehnquist, supra note
18, at 703-05.
SForexamples and commentary on Bickel's influence, see CHOPER, supra note
6, at 4-10; Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, in
The Storrs Lectures (Nov. 1983), 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1014 (1984).
95 BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16.
96 See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 107.
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that the power of judicial review is not explicitly in the Constitution. 97
Article III, he claimed, only refers to "'the judicial Power'" and "does not
purport to tell the Court how to decide cases." 98 The text and the historical
evidence concerning the framers' intent, furthermore, were inconclusive.
99
Bickel then pointed out that both Marshall and Hamilton had been
disingenuous in denying that judicial review in the name of the "people"
implied judicial supremacy.' ° Without question, when the Court declares
a legislative act unconstitutional, "it thwarts the will of the representatives
of the actual people here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it."'' For this reason, Bickel concluded,
"the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic."'0 2
3. Robert Bork's Original Understanding
Like Bickel, Robert Bork views the practice ofjudicial review as highly
problematic. 10 3 Unlike his mentor, however, Bork seeks to restrict its scope
significantly.' Bork relies on a sharp contrast between (legitimate) origin-
alist and (illegitimate) non-originalist approaches to constitutional interpre-
tation, arguing that his version of original understanding is the only means
through which judicial review and democracy can be reconciled. He claims
that most exercises of judicial review are illegitimate as judges either rely
upon extraconstitutional principles or do not apply constitutional principles
neutrally.'0 5 When constitutional provisions are vague or ambiguous, Bork
believes the inferences drawn in reaching legal conclusions must come
from premises clearly specified in the text or rooted in the specific
intentions of the framers. 0 6 As a result, Bork spends a great deal of time
97 BICKEL, supra note 2, at 1.
981Id. at 5.
"Id. at 15.
100Id.
' Id. at 16-17.
102 Id.
103 Bork, supra note 18, at 35.
'0 Bickel's concern was to specify the appropriate role for the Supreme Court.
See BICKEL supra note 2, at 23-24.
105 Bork, supra note 18, at 8-10.
'1 Id. at 13, 17, On the difficulties with specific intent theories of constitutional
interpretation, see Walter F. Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the
Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752, 1764-65 (1978) (book
review). For parallel problems concerning statutory interpretation, see generally
Gerald MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 754-82 (1966); Max
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explaining why judges must read the Constitution in a manner that strictly
limits their interpretive latitude. By contrast, when judges operate under
non-originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, he fears that
judicial decisionmaking cannot be principled in the sense of being faithful
to neutral constitutional values." 7
Bork's preoccupation with how to read the Constitution, however,
distracts his opponents from the fundamental weakness of his approach to
constitutional adjudication: he adheres to a theory of constitutional
democracy'that is not normatively defensible. Models based on interest
group pluralism may more or less accurately describe democratic politics
today, but such models fall far short of constituting a persuasive normative
argument for the raw majoritarian democracy that he advocates. Reducing
democracy to majority rule, moreover, is question-begging. The issue that
generates so much controversy in the first place is determining the kind of
democracy that would be most appropriate today. 08 Bork turns Bickel's
"counter-majoritarian tendency" into a much more serious antidemocratic
tendency by substituting "counter-majoritarian" for "antidemocratic" even
though these terms are not synonymous.
The development of a conception of democracy ought to precede any
attempt to offer a theory of constitutional interpretation. In other words, we
must be clear on the role the judiciary ought to play in a constitutional
democracy, before we decide how the constitutional text ought to be read.
This means that we need to engage in normative argumentation about the
character of democracy before addressing interpretive issues. 9 Yet Bork
makes virtually no attempt to defend his paper-thin conception of democ-
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 863-85 (1930).
07 Without a doubt, there are many difficulties associated with Bork's theory
of original understanding and with originalist jurisprudence more generally. At the
very least, judges and their clerks are not professional historians, and even if they
had such training, scholarly controversies still would be unavoidable. For this
reason, judges will end up taking sides in such controversies without being
sufficiently familiar with the relevant primary and secondary sources. It goes
without saying, moreover, that there are nearly insurmountable difficulties with
reconstructing original understanding (assuming that such an understanding existed
in the first place), applying abstract constitutional provisions to unforeseen
circumstances, and so on.
0 But see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 169-71 (1989)
(arguing that controversy over judicial review is also about resolving conflicts
between basic rights).
'" On the need for such normative argumentation, see GRIFFIN, supra note 21,
at 110.
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racy on moral grounds. In fact, he seems to be entirely unaware of the need
for such a defense at all. What little theory he puts forth rests on two highly
controversial premises. First, he takes for granted that democracy is
synonymous with raw majority rule."' Indeed, in The Tempting of
America,"' he offers no reasons for selecting this theory of democracy over
its rivals despite the fact that there are multiple models of democracy, many
of which are not predicated on extreme deference to majorities." 2 As one
commentator notes, the very idea of "democracy" is fundamentally
contested." 3
It is not as if Bork can wish away alternative models of democracy so
that he might conclude that democracy boils down to aggregating the
preferences of the electorate." 4 Such a conception cuts against a wide range
of more deliberative theories of democracy which require that citizens
justify their collective choices to their fellow citizens. The idea that
decisionmaking in a democracy can and should be more than the mere
product of the aggregated tastes, preferences, or prejudices of the majority
has deep roots in the scholarly literature on democratic theory and civic
republicanism. Indeed, by definition, a "constitutional" democracy places
some kind of limit on majority rule."' Bork also ignores the existence of
other counter-majoritarian constraints in our political system such as the
"I Bork writes, "The definition of democracy is that, after hearing argument,
citizens can vote their tastes and need not bow to elite opinion." ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 192 (1990).
Scalia also claims that popular will is "generally supreme in a democracy." Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989)
(Essay).
"' See BORK, supra note 111.
1.2 For example, Bentham favored voting based on preferences. By contrast,
Rousseau maintained that such votes must be based on the common good. See
Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 29 n. 14
(1986). Obviously, Bork takes Bentham's side in this debate, yet he apparently
does not recognize that in doing so, he is taking a controversial position.
"3 DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY xi (2d ed. 1996).
For an argument that majority rule is not a reliable instrument of democracy
in a racially divided society, see LAN GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:
FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994). For more
general criticism of thin conceptions of democracy, see Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence ofProcess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063
(1980).
.. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price ofAsking the Wrong Question: An Essay
on ConstitutionalScholarship andJudicialReview, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1231-33
(1984).
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congressional committee system, bicameralism, and the presidential veto." 6
At a minimum, he must address obvious objections to his more or less
utilitarian theory of democracy.
Bork is also a moral subjectivist, or moral relativist."7 Ironically, he
indicts one of his most prominent critics, Ronald Dworkin, on exactly this
116 See GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 109.
.. Consider the following sentences that Bork has written:
Every clash between a minority claiming freedom from regulation and a
majority asserting its freedom to regulate requires a choice between the
gratifications (or moral positions) of the two groups. When the Constitution
has not spoken, the Court will be able to find no scale, other than its own
value preferences, upon which to weigh the competing claims.
BORK, supra note 111, at 257. Not only has Bork begged the question by reducing
moral points of view to gratifications, but he also fails to see that respecting
"neutral" constitutional values itself requires a value choice that cannot simply be
a raw matter of taste or preference. Deference to original understanding, in other
words, must be argued for. From the proposition that value choices are really
subjective preferences, it follows that if anti-miscegenation laws are not covered
by the Equal Protection clause, which is likely to be the case from an originalist
standpoint, then there is no rational way of settling the dispute between those who
love someone of a different race and want to marry that person and racists who hate
the very idea of interracial relationships. It is far from obvious, of course, why
"gratifications" based racial prejudice should receive the same moral weight in
such a case, or for that matter, any weight at all. Bork also criticizes Griswold v.
Connecticut, 379 U.S. 926 (1964), on the same grounds: "the majority of
Connecticut's citizens believes that the use of contraceptives is profoundly
immoral. Knowledge that it is taking place and that the state makes no attempt to
inhibit it causes those in the majority moral anguish and so impairs their gratifica-
tions." See BORK, supra note 111, at 257-58. He also criticizes Tribe's view that
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), was wrongly decided:
How can any individual, professor, judge, or moral philosopher tell us
convincingly that, regardless of law or our own moral sense, certain forms
of unconventional behavior must be allowed? There is no apparent reason
why the Court should manipulate the level of generality to protect
unconventional sexual behavior any more than liberty should be taken at a
high enough level of abstraction to protect kleptomania. Tribe has more
sympathy for one than the other, but that hardly rises to the level of a
constitutional principle.
See BORK, supra note 111, at 204. Bork does not seem to consider the possibility
that Tribe has such sympathy because Tribe has good moral reasons that support
his conclusion, that is, premises that constitute a good argument (or at least a better
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charge."1 I Even more ironically, Bork denies that he is a moral relativist or
radical moral skeptic." 9 What is perhaps most disturbing about Bork's
reliance on relatively unconstrained democratic decisionmaking is that it
leaves little, if any, room for moral deliberation in democratic politics. 20
Apart from the issue of whether political representation can work in
practice, collective decisions on the most important public matters should
never rest on the mere prejudice of the majority. 2 ' A preference that is
based on racial hatred, for instance, should not be accorded any moral
weight at all. Advocates of originalism, orjudicial restraint more generally,
put tremendous faith in the capacity of the people and their representatives
to make morally acceptable decisions without any restraints. The problem
is that people cannot simply be left to vote their preferences without some
argument than his opponents have been able to put forth). Whether Tribe is right
or wrong is neither here nor there. Rather, the point is that such an argument is
possible, yet Bork rules out this possibility at the outset. Outside of economics,
political science, and English departments, very few people believe that moral
propositions cannot be true or false, even if such propositions are not analytically
true or false (that is, true or false by definition) or empirically verifiable (as in the
case of a scientific proposition).
118 BORK, supra note 11, at 213. In fact, nothing could be further from the
truth. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You 'dBetter Believe It, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 87-139 (Spring 1996).
"9 BORK, supra note 111, at 259.
'20 The core idea of a deliberative democracy is that "when citizens or their
representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach
mutually acceptable decisions." AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISAGREEMENT 1 (1996).
'2' The very concept of representation is highly problematic, independent of
whether special interests tend to have disproportionate influence in the
policymaking process. As Rousseau once put it, "The English people believes itself
to be free. It is greatly mistaken; it is free only during the election of the members
of Parliament. Once they are elected, the populace is enslaved; it is nothing." JEAN
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 74 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1762). For an anarchist interpretation of Rousseau, see
ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 5-25 (1970). Consider the
following conceptual problems with contemporary American representative
democracy: (1) It is unclear whether those who do not vote at all or who vote for
a losing candidate are really being represented in a winner-take-all system with
arbitrary geographic divisions; (2) It is virtually impossible for a citizen to find a
representative whose political positions mirror his or her own on every single
political issue. As such, when that elected city, state, or federal official casts a vote,
that vote may not have been how the citizen who is "represented" would have
voted.
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sort of minimal constraint that determines which preferences are morally
acceptable. Bork's morally relativistic deference to mere preferences means
that he would have to concede that the treatment of women and various
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities as second-class citizens in the past
was neither right nor wrong, but only a matter of personal taste. 2 Indeed,
before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, a court that tried to
remedy political inequality was acting illegitimately. For Bork, there is no
room for rational discussion about the facts and reasons that might underlie
such preferences.
It is more or less obvious why such a normative account of our shared
political life leaves much to be desired.'23 One might ask Bork whether he
believes that a preference for original understanding, or democracy itself,
can be reduced to matters of taste. This Article does not suggest that a
question of such enormous political and normative significance-what is
the best conception of democracy for us today--can be settled by a mere
definition. Rather, the point is that much of what passes as disagreement
over judicial review is really about a more fundamental question concern-
ing how people who want to pursue different ends that may at times come
into conflict can still live together. We must develop the best arguments
possible in formulating a conception of democracy that yields results that
are both democratically legitimate and morally acceptable in the sense of
being fair to everyone affected. Because Bork makes no real attempt to
defend his particular theory of democracy, he leaves the most important
normative question unanswered. For this reason, more generally, those who
adhere to non-originalist theories of constitutional interpretation should not
concede democratic ground to their critics. Bork's theory of original
understanding is only intrinsically democratic on the basis of his particular
definition of democracy, a definition that he does not defend against
obvious objections.
B. Deference: The Argument in Favor of Judicial Review
Bork's failure to establish his own democratic credentials, however,
does not mean that those who favor more activist forms of judicial review
do any better. 4 Although these theories also have weaknesses, judicial
122 For evidence of Bork's moral relativism earlier in his academic career; see
Bork, supra note 18, at 9-10.
123 See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 103-04.
124' This Article will not rehearse in any detail the wide range of arguments that
aim at establishing the democratic credentials of this kind ofjudicial review. The
sheer size of the literature on the topic makes it extremely difficult to summarize
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supremacy-letting judges have the final say on constitutional essen-
tials-is appealing because most ofus appreciate the desirability of keeping
the wrong kind of politics out of legal decisionmaking to protect the
fundamental rights of individuals and of discrete and insular minority
groups. 25 This seems to be the lesson of Brown. 26 A democracy that solely
consists of bargaining among interest groups is likely to exclude groups
that lack political resources, and thus lead to unfair outcomes.'27
At their best, courts can function as forums of principled, rational
argumentation in which legal premises are offered to support legal
conclusions.'28 Under this view, the judiciary has the responsibility of
protecting higher law, that is, the most important constitutional values,
from the intrusions of transient majorities. As such, the most fundamental
political questions must be removed from everyday democratic politics by
turning them into legal questions, thereby handing them over to judges.
Those who have defended the rationality of the way in which judges decide
cases, at least under optimal conditions, have tried to establish that it is
possible to keep law and politics sufficiently separate.'29 A judge could
reach a legal conclusion in a particular case yet at the same time could have
reached a different conclusion based on political, religious, or moral
grounds. Put differently, the judge recognizes that good legal reasons may
differ from those that he or she would appeal to if he or she were making
a personal decision that did not have to be justified to others. 3
the various schools of thought. See supra notes 7-12.
'25 In effect, the justices of the United States Supreme Court also have the final
word on such questions. It is no secret that federal question jurisdiction covers an
extremely wide range of political issues. It also goes without saying that the
extraordinary difficulty of amending the Constitution through the two procedures
specified in Article V renders the vast majority of U.S. Supreme Court decisions
final. Even when the Court denies certiorari, letting the lower appellate court
decision stand, in effect it has rendered a judgment on the legal issue.
126 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12 7 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 18-24.
128 Michael Perry contends that judicial review is justified because it introduces
a deliberative element into ordinary politics. See PERRY, supra note 7, at 106-10.
129 For the most part, this argument is made from a theoretical standpoint. The
institutional realities of Supreme Court decisionmaking suggest that we should not
jump to the conclusion that the decisions of lower court judges, especially in
politically-charged cases, are not affected by partisan considerations. On this point,
see GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 123.
130 Cf Wechsler, supra note 33, at 15-16 (arguing that in constitutional cases
judges must make a judgment among various values).
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C. A More Democratic Form of Judicial Review
At times, there may be very good reasons to let judges make decisions
that protect fundamental rights, advance political equality, and so on. For
instance, certain decisions such as Brown13' have furthered equal citizen-
ship and social justice in America. 132 Even Bork himself believes that
Brown was rightly decided.13 At its best, judicial review has corrected
some of the market failures of the actual practice of democracy and has put
fundamental political issues on the national agenda that otherwise might
have remained buried because they were too politically controversial to be
addressed by the other branches. 134 One might conclude that judicial review
is indeed antidemocratic, but that its purpose is perfectly legitimate in a
constitutional democracy that seeks to preserve fundamental values that
should never be compromised. 135 However, the point is that these means are
undemocratic because under such a scheme, citizens leave difficult choices
of public morality to others. In a sense, then, those who claim that judicial
review can be squared with democracy are trading on an ambiguity. Such
review may advance democratic ends such as political equality, but that
does not mean that the means are democratic as well. As stated in the
Introduction, 136 the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review between
proponents of judicial constraint and those of judicial activism overlooks
a third possibility: that citizens might decide constitutional essentials for
themselves without so much judicial oversight.
By accepting constitutional review by judges, citizens delegate to
experts the right to make moral decisions for the entire nation.137 Whether
judges are likely to be more morally sensitive than ordinary citizens,
though, is an open question. Indeed, we have some reasons to believe that
even the Supreme Court is not really a deliberative institution where the
justices exchange reasons with their fellow justices in trying to convince
them to change their minds.13' At most: the assumption that judges possess
131 Brown, 347 U.S. at 438.
132 Cf HAND, supra note 35, at 54-55; Wechsler, supra note 33, at 19.
a33 BORK, supra note 111, at 74-84.
134 See ROSENBERG, supra note 75. See also ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 131-
50.
135 See supra notes 8-12.
136 See supra notes 3-28 and accompanying text.
13' For an account of the fundamental tension between philosophical and
democratic authority, see Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL.
THEORY 379 (1981).
131 Cf LAZARUS, supra note 93 (discussing the partisan forces that contribute
to the Court's decisionmaking).
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greater moral wisdom than ordinary citizens is highly questionable." 9
Although they may have extensive technical expertise in specialized areas
of the law, judges may also lack the kind of moral sensitivity that would
allow them to react appropriately to real cases.'40 Such judgment would
seem to require a wide range of life experiences and an appropriate series
of emotional responses that judges may not possess despite their legal
training. As many critics have pointed out, the most brilliant legal minds
often do not make it to the bench. 4' Furthermore, after Bush v. Gore,42 we
ought to be more skeptical of the willingness of the current United States
Supreme Court to keep politics and the law separate.
143
On the other hand, it makes little sense to entrust this responsibility of
keeping politics and law separate to voters who are uninformed about
constitutional considerations or who only see democratic politics as a
means of advancing their respective interests. Citizens who are ignorant
and depraved will not make good political choices, that is obvious. Yet
such charges should not be exaggerated, especially when we have made
little effort to prepare citizens for citizenship in the first place. A move
toward a more democratic theory of constitutional review would not occur
overnight, of course, but instead would require careful planning on the part
139 Many constitutional law scholars and political scientists have seen
constitutional adjudication as a mix of law and politics. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD
HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 184-88
(1981); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 271-84 (1991).
0 Compared with ordinary statutory and common-law questions, constitutional
issues turn less on technical legal analysis and more "on a choice between
competing sections that contain conflicting political and social values." FISHER,
supra note 43, at 5. For this reason, in reviewing these sorts of cases, having moral
wisdom is indispensable and perhaps more important than having specialized
training in particular areas of the law.
'41 On the role of merit in selecting, appointing, and confirning federal judges,
see Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide
to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1735 (1988).
142 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
'4" At the very least, the poor quality of the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore
should call into question our confidence that the Court can render principled
judgments. For an argument that the Court could have reached a more principled
legal rationale supporting the same legal conclusion, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COURTS 3-4 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature
Thereof May Direct": The Outcome of Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE:
BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 13-37 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A.
Epstein eds., 2001).
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of civic educators.' The widespread acceptance of judicial review in one
form or another by originalists and non-originalists alike means that it is not
imperative for citizens to have an adequate understanding of constitutional
values when they cast their ballots; courts can be expected to correct their
mistakes or those of their elected representatives.
Our preoccupation with the results that the Court has reached in the
past, many of which are morally justified, can blind us to the serious costs
of relying so heavily on judicial review as an insurance policy against
democratic excess. A conception of democracy that reserves serious moral
argumentation for courtrooms is less likely to cultivate citizens who are
critical of the uses of political power by the state. Citizens who transfer so
much power to courts are probably more prone to accept political authority
uncritically as well.'4 5 One does not have to romanticize the New England
town meeting or the Lincoln-Douglas senatorial debates to recognize the
importance of a moral deliberation model in which citizens address and
resolve political conflicts together in a principled manner. The fact that
critical constitutional issues are resolved chiefly through litigation should
trouble us, to the extent that the legal process is opaque to the vast majority
of citizens. A democracy in which most citizens exercise very little real
political power because many of their collective decisions are subject to
judicial review, arguably does not meet the requirement of democratic self-
rule. In fact, such a political system might be more accurately characterized
as an elite democracy or as an oligarchy.
II. RAWLSIAN PUBLIC REASON
A. Overview
The purpose of this section is to show that citizens' practice of
Rawlsian public reason could produce collective decisions that are both
'44 See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1999) (offering
a variety of ideas about how citizens can be educated in democratic values and
emphasizing the importance of the development of their deliberative capacities).
141 H.L.A. Hart claims that authority, by its very nature, excludes deliberation.
Summarizing the thought of Hobbes, he remarks that authority is intended "to
preclude or cut off any independent deliberation by the hearer of the merits of pro and
con of doing the act." H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 253 (1982). David Gauthier writes that "[a]n appeal
to authority--to requirements imposed by authority-is an alternative to an appeal to
reason-4o requirements based on reasons for acting." DAVID P. GAUTHIER,
PRACTICAL REASONING: THE STRUCTURE AND FOUNDATIONS OF PRUDENTIAL AND
MORAL ARGUMENTS AND THEIR EXEMPLIFICATION IN DISCOURSE 139 (1963).
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democratically legitimate and morally acceptable, thus drastically reducing
the need for judicial oversight.'46 This constrained process of decision-
making shows that the apparent choice between two extremes, one that is
too deferential to judges and one that is too deferential to the raw prefer-
ences of the people, is false. By following the limits of public reason when
they resolve fundamental political questions, political majorities can have
their way, but only when they can offer acceptable justifications to political
minorities or to individual dissenters. This section will be divided into the
following subsections: (1) a detailed description of Rawlsian public reason;
(2) an assessment of its implications for democratic citizenship; and (3) an
argument that this kind of reason parallels that ofjudicial review but unlike
such review, possesses democratic legitimacy.'47
B. The Idea of Public Reason
Above all, Rawls' more recent writings are concerned with how people
who have different and often conflicting ends can formulate mutually
acceptable terms to govern their common life. These terms are not just any
terms that are reached as the result of a bargain or that are imposed by the
strongest party. Instead, these terms must respect the political equality of
all citizens and their freedom to pursue their respective conceptions of a
good life. A society whose citizens and elected officials do not comply with
public reason is not well-ordered. 4 In addition, the failure to follow public
reason undermines the mutual trust and civic friendship that holds a
morally and religiously pluralistic political community together over time.
Without public reason, for Rawls, people who share the same social space
will never be able to live together as political equals.
The idea of public reason has its roots in Rousseau's concept of the
general will.'49 Following Rousseau, Rawls believes that citizens should not
' For an excellent overview of Rawlsian public reason, see Kent Greenawalt,
On Public Reason, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669 (1994); Lawrence B. Solun,
Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993). For a
more general Kantian account of the public use of reason, see ONORA O'NEILL,
CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
28-50 (1989).
147 This Article does not argue that judicial review should be wholly replaced.
Rather, its exercise should not extend to questions of public morality that should
be resolved by citizens themselves after sufficient public deliberation.
141 On this point, see Paul J. Weithman, Citizenship and Public Reason, in
NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 125, 126 (Robert P. George & Christopher
Wolfe eds., 2000).
149 As Rousseau puts it, the general will is "concerned with their common
preservation and general well-being." ROUSSEAU, supra note 122, at 79. Rawls'
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cast their ballots on the basis of their preferences or personal interests. 50
Rather, their collective decisions should be predicated upon reasons that
ensure that each member of the political community is treated equally.
Rawls insists that citizens must restrain themselves by observing public
reason when they deliberate and vote on fundamental political questions. 5'
"Public reason" is designed to map the kinds of reasons and arguments that
are appropriate in justifying legislation on the most important political
questions to all reasonable persons. Under conditions of moral pluralism,'52
public reason is the only normative political language that makes such
justification possible. For Rawls, voting is not a private act because it
creates law that affects the entire political community and is backed by the
coercive power of the state. To produce legitimate legislative outcomes,
citizens must refrain from voting according to reasons that are non-
public---that is, those that would be unfair in a society that does not share
the same moral or religious convictions.
The existence of moral pluralism renders the problem of public
justification more critical than ever before because there is no guarantee
that public deliberation will fulfill its purpose of producing authoritative
collective decisions that legitimize the use of force against those who refuse
to comply.'53 A society whose members could keep their deeper differences
private or who were not tempted to extend their sectarian convictions to the
public realm without properjustification would not need public reason. The
idea of voting according to public reason parallels that of Rousseau, who thought
that votes should be based on interpretations of the common good rather than on
mere preferences. Rousseau restricted popular decisionmaking to votes on laws
instead of their implementation in particular instances. For him, only the social
compact to form a civil association in the first place requires unanimity. Id. at 81.
In all other instances, the vote of the majority binds everyone who has consented
to the compact. Id. at 82.
On the centrality of public reason to Rawls' political liberalism, see Bruce A.
Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, 91 J. PHIL. 364, 368 (1994).
"' On the basic difference between Rousseau's and Bentham's voting schemes,
see Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception ofDemocracy, 97 ETHICS 26, 29 n. 14
(1986).
" Rousseau also believed that the more important a political decision, the
closer the vote should be to unanimity. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 122, at 82.
15 "Conditions of moral pluralism," following Rawls, refers to intractable
disagreement over the nature of the good life for human beings. Rawls refers to this
condition as the existence of reasonable pluralism; it is moral because it refers to
people's deepest convictions.
'13 For Rawls' last views on public justification, see RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS, supra note 28, § 9, at 26-29.
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question of what reasons justify a certain vote on fundamental political
questions means that we must know the general classes of reasons that we
could give to others and that they might find acceptable independent of
their deeper religious or philosophical beliefs. Otherwise, public delibera-
tion will not produce legitimate collective decisions.
Rawls seeks to offer an account, then, of the sorts of legitimate, or fair,
reasons that could be introduced in public deliberation. If citizens are to
reach consensus on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice,
they must recognize more or less the same reasons as good reasons in
justifying public laws. Such consensus may not be secured, though, when
citizens can offer any reasons or arguments that they like. The fact that
deliberation is intended to justify the coercive power of the state means that
citizens should not offer idiosyncratic or parochial reasons to justify their
votes. Nor should they appeal to deeper moral or religious convictions that
are bound to be controversial in a morally pluralistic society such as our
own.
For Rawls, rejecting public reason has serious consequences. As one
commentator explains:
[T]o reject the claims of public reason at this level is to opt out of rational
dialogue, it is to take a position outside the language game of rational
discussion about narrative issues. One must be willing to say to others: "I
cannot give you a reason you accept, and I am not willing to attempt to
give you a reason or to offer my reasons for your perusal. I shall simply
do as I wish, given my point of view." That is an extreme position.
154
The unwillingness of a citizen to justify his or her vote to the fellow citizen
through reasons that might be acceptable to them also puts into consider-
able doubt the legitimacy of collective decisions. For instance, it is not
clear why a dissenter would be morally bound to obey a law that is not
predicated upon fair reasons. The practice of public reason addresses this
concern; it makes public justification, and thus political legitimacy,
possible under conditions of moral pluralism because public reasons are
limited to premises that can appeal to a morally diverse audience. The
thought is that citizens, when they attempt to offer justifiable reasons to
their fellow citizens, ought to draw upon the same general class of reasons,
thus bringing citizens who have different conceptions of the common good
closer together.
It is important to note that the scope of public reason is quite limited.
First, it is not to be applied to the background culture, including churches,
114 Bruce W. Brower, The Limits of Public Reason, 91 J. PHIL. 5, 26 (1994).
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associations, universities, professional associations, and the media.'
Second, the balance of non-public reasons can decide any issue that does
not fall under "constitutional essentials" or "questions of basic justice. ' 56
Rawls believes that public reason should address only the most important
political matters, that is, those that are too important to be decided by the
sum of the preferences of the electorate. By definition, public reason is a
regulatory political morality. Public reason cannot answer deeper philo-
sophical questions about what is valuable in human life or evaluate any
reasonable moral or religious conviction on its merits; that is not its
purpose. Rather, public reason is a moral standard that governs the political
relationships and actions of citizens whose ends are bound to conflict at
times. If such ends never came into conflict, then public reason would no
longer be necessary.
C. Rawlsian Citizenship
To be a citizen of the Rawlsian well-ordered society is to belong to a
political society whose members are politically equal. For Rawls, good
citizenship entails the willingness to become conversant in the language of
public reason and to comply with its norms when necessary. In particular,
when one assumes the role of citizen, the balance of public reasons must be
allowed to resolve the most important political questions:
[Public reason is] the reason of equal citizens [in a democratic society]
who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over
one another in enacting laws and amending their constitution.... [T]he
limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but
only to those involving what we may call 'constitutional essentials' and
questions of basic justice. This means that political values alone are to
settle such fundamental questions as who has the right to vote, or what
religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of
opportunity, or to hold property. These and similar questions are the
special subject of public reason.1
57
Public reason is predicated on an ideal of democratic citizenship that suits
conditions of moral pluralism. Such conditions are problematic to the
extent that reasonable citizens may have very different ideas about the
15 See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, at 134 n.13.
56 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 28, at 89.
157 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 214.
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kinds of public laws that should be enacted. Public reason is a political
morality because it is limited to this context; it only outlines how citizens
ought to treat one another-as free and equal beings--when they must
resolve fundamental political questions that affect the entire political
community. Therefore, understanding the ideal of public reason is vital to
understanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic citizen.158 Citizens
do not vote their interests, tastes, or preferences; moreover, they do not
appeal to what they believe to be right or true according to their own
comprehensive doctrines."19 Citizens are supposed to vote for candidates
who honor the limits of public reason, thereby ensuring that candidates and
elected officials will observe them as well.
This self-restraint on the part of citizens allows them to make collective
decisions on fundamental political questions without convergence at deeper
levels.160 Public reason also sets out guidelines for public inquiry and
criteria as to the information and knowledge relevant in discussing and
resolving such questions.16 This reason aims to narrow our deeper
differences and render them more manageable when collective decisions
have to be made to the satisfaction of every reasonable person who is
affected by them. For this reason, we should not draw inferences from
premises that are too deeply embedded in particular comprehensive
doctrines when we seek to convince the other members of our political
community. A person would not want to assume the truth of Roman
Catholic theology, for instance, if he or she were trying to convince non-
Catholics that abortion or euthanasia should be illegal. Instead, we must try
to reason based on premises that responsible citizens accept to reach
conclusions that we think that they could also reasonably accept. Certain
kinds of arguments must be ruled out as illegitimate at the outset because
they could not possibly convince those who do not already accept their
basic premises.
The existence of deep moral pluralism, for Rawls, means that we must
use authorities acceptable to those with whom we disagree if we are to meet
the minimal requirements of political legitimacy and thereby avoid
unjustified coercion. Public justification is addressed to others and must
158 Id. at 218.
159 
Id.
160 This interpretation of Rawlsian public reason finds additional support in
Rawls' idea of "decent nonliberal peoples" in which "decent" is an even weaker
constraint than "reasonable." See JOHN RAWLS, The Law of Peoples, in THE LAW
OF PEOPLES, supra note 28, at 3, 60-67.
161 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 28, § 8.3, at 89.
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begin with what is, or can be, held in common.' 62 To treat our fellow
citizens fairly, we must be willing to cast our arguments in ways that are
likely to appeal to them. Hence, it is not enough that a person has an intense
desire to do something or believes with all of his or her heart that a
particular belief is true. Explanations as to why dissenters are justifiably
coerced must be public in the sense that they can be universalized or widely
accepted under conditions of moral pluralism. A premise that cannot be
known or justified apart from its deeper theoretical sources fails to satisfy
public reason's requirement of reciprocity, because it could not support a
mutually acceptable conclusion. A citizen who reasons from premises that
he or she already knows some of the reasonable members of her audience
will never accept fails to respect the freedom and equality of his or her
fellow citizens. Reasons and arguments whose grounds are private or are
too complex to be understood by others-e.g., those that are based on pure
self-interest or on a particular conception of the human good-must be
ruled out prior to actual deliberation to prevent citizens from being driven
farther apart.
In short, the legitimate exercise of political power must be justified on
more restrictive grounds. Rawls hopes that civic reasoning can be "public"
in that it aims to persuade a particular audience, namely all of the reason-
able members of the well-ordered society. The goal is to find reasons that
will secure the assent of everyone. To be convinced by a public reason is
to be convinced by a reason that can be universalized irrespective of deeper
philosophical or religious divisions. A citizen must imagine whether that
reason would be a sufficient reason from the standpoint of another
reasonable person who does not, and cannot ever reasonably be expected
to, share his or her comprehensive religious or moral beliefs about the
human good. Public reason requires us to put ourselves into the shoes of
others and to try to see fundamental political questions from their
perspective before we make political choices. We fail to meet this
requirement when we do not engage in this kind of thought experiment and
do not exercise the kind of self-control that it demands.
Civic reasoning within the constraints of public reason, Rawls believes,
can fulfill the minimal conditions of political legitimacy without fully
liberalizing underlying reasonable comprehensive doctrines; thus, it
remains true to the principle of liberal neutrality toward reasonable
conceptions of the common good. 63 The possibility of this kind of
justification raises the question of how minimal this justification must be
162 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 100.
163 See id. at 49-51.
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in order to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of those who do not share more
or less liberal views of human flourishing. Put another way, in the midst of
reasonable moral pluralism, are there any reasons that can be sufficiently
universalized to legitimate the most important collective decisions? Can
Jews, Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, and Atheists, for example, ever find
common ground in political life? The answer to this question is important
because any theory ofjustice must have a principled response to those who
dissent-a response that explains why dissenters have a moral duty to
fulfill their civic responsibilities willingly, and even more basically, to
comply with the law. One of the central purposes of Rawlsian public reason
is to show that citizens who have very different values still have such a duty
when they assume the role of citizen and vote on the most important
political questions.
This order, of course, is tall. Rawls insists that a citizen can have a non-
liberal conception of the human good and nonetheless be reasonable in his
sense of the term.16 There is hope, because many contemporary compre-
hensive doctrines support free thought and liberty of conscience in the
abstract. 6 Their looseness, furthermore, will enable their adherents to
endorse regulatory political principles from a wide variety of moral
perspectives." s Reasonableness describes the attitude that characterizes a
citizen who is willing to comply with norms of public reason. Being
reasonable is essential in the midst of moral pluralism because reasonable
persons recognize the primacy of political values, that is, the overriding
importance of treating all citizens as free and equal beings who have life
plans of their own. By implication, unreasonable people withhold their
consent from principles that are fair to everyone on account of non-public
reasons rooted in their deeper sectarian beliefs.
'6 Reasonable citizens are those who are willing "to propose and honor fair
terms of cooperation" and "to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept
their consequences." Id. at 49 n. 1, 49-51.
165 See LeifWenar, Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique, 106 ETHICS 32,
42 (1995).
166 According to Rawls, reasonable persons: (1) possess the two moral powers
-i.e., a capacity for a sense ofjustice and a capacity for a conception of the good;
(2) have the intellectual powers of judgment, inference, and the ability to assess
evidence rationally; (3) have a determinate conception of the good; (4) are willing
to be sincere, fully cooperating members of the well-ordered society; (5) will
propose and willingly abide by fair terms of social cooperation so long as others
reciprocate; (6) acknowledge the burdens ofjudgment; and (7) have a reasonable
moral psychology. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 48-58, 81-
86.
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D. Difficulties with Public Reason
Some critics of Rawlsian public reason allege that citizens should be
able to introduce any reason or argument into public deliberation. 67 Others
have challenged Rawls' definition of reasonableness on the grounds that it
excludes too many citizens from the "legitimation pool"--the group of
persons whose endorsement would legitimate collective decisions made on
the basis of public reason.161 More specifically, many critics worry that it
is unfair to ask religious citizens to refrain from introducing their theologi-
cal views into public debate or from appealing to them when they decide
how to vote.' 69 Privatizing religion does not permit them, these critics
maintain, to remain faithful to the requirements of their religious dogmas. 7°
To insist that religion should not play a public role, they complain, is to ask
religious citizens to give up their conception of "the good." Furthermore,
the effects of public reason restrictions are hardly neutral when citizens
with non-liberal conceptions of the good (and their children) are likely to
feel pressure to assimilate into a secular culture. As one commentator
167 See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Difference as a Resource for Democratic
Communication, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLrIICS
383 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997). Other critics go further and
claim that public reason is a hegemonic, oppressive mode of discourse. See, e.g.,
Sheldon S. Wolin, The Liberal/Democratic Divide: On Rawls's Political
Liberalism, 24 POL. THEORY 97, 102 (1996) (book review).
168 1 owe the term "legitimation pool" to Marilyn Friedman. See Marilyn
Friedman, John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People, in THE
IDEA OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON RAWLS 16, 16 (Victoria Davion &
Clark Wolf eds., 2000). For a more general account of the problem of political
legitimacy, see LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1988). For an
account of the relationship between justification and legitimacy, see A. John
Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 109 ETHICS 739 (1999).
169 See, e.g., Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject What Liberalism
Tells Us about Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons, in RELIGION
AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 162 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997). However,
Rawls later added a "proviso," taking back the more restrictive view of public
reason. According to the later view, citizens may propose whatever considerations
they like in public deliberation provided that they are prepared to offer public
reasons "in due course." See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at li-
lii.
170 See Patrick Neal, Political Liberalism, Public Reason, and the Citizen of
Faith, in NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON 171, 171-201 (Robert P. George &
Christopher Wolfe eds., 2000) (arguing that refusing to subordinate one's religious
convictions is not a failure to respect one's fellow citizens as equals).
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remarks, "The manifold blessings of liberal social orders come at a price,
and we should not be surprised that those who pay the most occasionally
grow restive.""'
The likelihood that some comprehensive doctrines will not thrive under
his regime of public reason might cut against his claim that all reasonable
groups could support it for their own reasons. This Article argues that life
plans that are unreasonable--i.e., those that do not respect the freedom and
equality of the other members of the political community-are not entitled
to any weight at all when we must determine what kinds of reasons justify
political coercion on the part of the state. In the end, it is not clear why we
must give reasons to those in our political community who refuse to respect
us, that is, to treat us as political equals. Conceptions of the human good
that do not tolerate the reasonable life plans of others may be legitimately
opposed. An objection that political liberalism does not carve out sufficient
space for all reasonable comprehensive doctrines would have to demon-
strate that Rawls' political conception ofjustice does not identify the right
space.' 7 2 The real issue is whether the exclusion or restriction of certain
ways of life can be defended as being as fair as possible to the others who
reside within the political community.
It is not enough to insist that one's life plan could be disadvantaged by
a particular conception of justice. A person who enjoys the thrill of crime
will resent the enforcement of the penal code, but that does not mean such
laws are unfair or could not be justified to him or her. Because no political
conception of justice can be perfectly neutral when human beings inhabit
the same social space, what makes it reasonable to reject a regulatory
political morality such as public reason is either that it leaves a citizen too
badly off compared with others or that it demands too much of him or
her. ' At the very least, those who believe Rawlsian public reason leaves
inadequate room for diversity must offer an alternative that is fairer to all
conceptions of the good, yet at the same time achieves political legitimacy.
One cannot simply wish moral pluralism out of existence and then put
forth a utopian conception of justice that assumes people's ends can easily
be harmonized. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a human society that did not
marginalize some conceptions of the good, especially those that cannot
'1 William A. Galston, What is Living and What is Dead in Kant's Practical
Philosophy?, in KANT & POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE CONTEMPORARY LEGACY
207, 222 (Ronald Beiner & William James Booth eds., 1993).
172 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 198 n.33.
"7 I borrow this definition from Thomas Nagel. THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY
AND IMPARTIALITY 38 (1991).
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peacefully coexist with other conceptions. It is not as if political morality
can include all conceptions of the good when the very problem in the first
place is that such conceptions, even reasonable ones, come into conflict at
times. The real question is whether such marginalization is legitimate-in
the sense that it is acceptable to use force or civil sanctions against those
who refuse to comply. Fundamentalist Christians may have a right to home-
school their children and to raise them in a religious environment. This
right does not mean, however, that they also may use the coercive power of
the state to force others to comply with their religious convictions. Being
unreasonable boils down to a failure to appreciate that public laws should
not be based on controversial sectarian doctrines unjustifiable to a morally
diverse citizenry. Because of the unwillingness of unreasonable citizens to
extend civic respect to others, unreasonable persons can be coerced
(provided that the reasons offered for such coercion are sufficiently
reasonable). Presumably, whether a citizen is reasonable or unreasonable
on a particular fundamental political question could be determined on a
case-by-case basis sensitive to the relevant details.
In principle, regulatory norms of public reason will encourage the
flourishing of different ways of life because they do not attempt to assess
life plans on their merits. In fact, Rawls' political liberalism more generally
might even be challenged on the grounds that his refusal to rank particular
conceptions of the good reveals a distinct, and arguably controversial, anti-
perfectionist tolerance for individual inclinations.174 A life plan that appears
to be silly or eccentric to you or me, provided that it is reasonable in the
sense of not unreasonably interfering with those of others, should not fare
any worse than other reasonable life plans would fare in a perfectly
competitive market. The point is to permit citizens to pursue their diverse
ends because such ends are deeply personal matters that can be expected to
vary from person to person. Rawls' theory of public reason is only designed
to settle conflicts among the plurality of ends that inevitably arise in
political life. Individuals have a basic right to reach their own conclusions
about how they ought to live, provided that their way of life does not
unreasonably interfere with the life plans of others. As long as citizens
decide to form political communities, they must construct regulatory
principles that allow them to make difficult collective choices as fairly as
possible. One cannot simply object that such principles are unnecessary in
'74 See Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES
ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE 1, 9 (Norman Daniels ed., Stanford University
Press, 1989) (1975).
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a more ideal, communitarian society, because any political theory worthy
of our consideration must explain how political conflicts will be resolved.
Those who are critical of Rawls' approach must show that their
alternatives would accommodate more conceptions of the good than Rawls'
theory would accommodate, while still meeting the minimal requirements
of political legitimacy. They must address the deeper problem of figuring
out how clashes of ideals can be settled in a mutually acceptable manner to
avoid unjustified coercion. Appeals to unregulated public deliberation, as
I suggested above, seem to deny the very existence of moral pluralism, or
at least to deny that pluralism presents much of a problem from the
perspective of public justification or political legitimacy. Whether diversity
would grow under Rawls' scheme, of course, remains to be seen. Yet the
case for his idea of public reason looks more promising than vague appeals
to ideals of diversity, tolerance, or community, because the reciprocity
implicit in public reason would not reduce a morally acceptable collective
life to a common Millian or Kantian life plan. 75 As Rawls makes clear,
moral autonomy fails to satisfy the constraint of reciprocity.'76 The
restrictions on the kinds of arguments that are legitimate within the limits
of public reason also preclude those based on secular comprehensive ideals
such as Lockean self-ownership, Kantian autonomy, and Millian individu-
ality. These doctrines are sectarian and consequently cannot be universal-
ized to serve as the basis of public morality.'77
E. Voting According to Public Reason
Commentators have focused almost exclusively on the deliberative
aspects of public reason-whether it is overly restrictive, too liberal, too
unrealistic, and so on--and have not given voting behavior in the Rawlsian
society the attention that it deserves. As Rawls himself makes clear, it is
imperative that citizens not only deliberate within certain constraints, but
also vote in a manner that satisfies these constraints. 7 It makes little sense
to require citizens to deliberate within certain parameters and then to allow
... See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 98.
76ee Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, § 2.4, at 146.
'77 All comprehensive views-e.g., Roman Catholicism, Judaism, Atheism, or
liberal views such as that of Locke, Kant, and Mill--are too controversial to be
shared by all reasonable citizens. The idea is that all comprehensive doctrines are
sectarian. Hence the need for a public or political morality that is not premised on
any articular comprehensive doctrine.
17' See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 219.
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them to vote differently. There are two non-public reason ways to vote: (1)
a citizen could vote to advance his or her own individual good irrespective
of other considerations; or (2) he or she could vote to further his or her own
sectarian good as a good for everyone, that is, as the basis of public
morality. Rawls tells us that citizens who are not government officials
realize the ideal of public reason by thinking of themselves as if they were
legislators and by holding government officials to the restrictions of public
reason. 79 Although usually they do not directly vote on matters of public
concern, their civic duty requires citizens to ensure that particular statutes
do not conflict with norms of public reason. They fulfill this civic duty by
monitoring their elected representatives.
Whether ordinary citizens can live up to this duty, furthermore, is not
only a matter of their being motivated to vote appropriately,80 they must
also apply the norms of public reason competently in determining whether
their elected officials have acted for the right (sufficiently public) reasons.
The "right" part of reasons under conditions of moral pluralism rules out
appeals to the divine nature of religious texts, to religious faith, and to
revelation. An orthodox Jew, for example, could not use the Talmud to
justify dietary restrictions for everyone even though he or she is free to
make the same case on other grounds and is welcome to make such a case
within her particular religious community. Arguing that abortion, homosex-
uality, or physician-assisted suicide is wrong on the basis of Roman
Catholic theology would likewise violate public reason by inappropriately
introducing a comprehensive doctrine into the discourse. Yet arguing for
the same conclusion from premises based on public reasons, such as the
negative effects that these practices might have on the family or on future
citizenship, would be permissible."8' Whether this argument, based on
public reason, could be countered by more convincing public reasons
leading to the contrary conclusion would be settled by actual political
discourse conducted appropriately.
As Rawls reminds us, public reason does not answer all political
questions in advance.'82 However, it does outline the kinds of general
reasons that are sufficiently public in the sense of being morally acceptable
'7 See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, § 1.1, at 135-36.
180 After all, this civic duty is not legally enforceable but is self-imposed. See
Evan Charney, Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public
Sphere, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 97, 101 (1998).
181 See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, § 2.4, at 146-49.
82Id. § 6.1, at 164.
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to those who do not share the same conception of the good." 3 Even if the
public reason constraints on public deliberation are not as strict as Rawls
initially made them out to be, citizens still have a moral and civic obligation
to vote according to them.184 They must base their votes on reasons that
they sincerely believe could be justified to those who do not share their
deeper convictions. Because comprehensive conceptions of the common
good cannot be universalized under conditions of moral pluralism, the
reasons for voting one way rather than another must take into account other
people who cannot be expected to accept reasons that have a controversial
pedigree. Citizens who do not vote according to public reason on constitu-
tional essentials and matters of basic justice commit the civic sin of failing
to respect the freedom and equality of their fellow citizens.
In effect, a vote based on non-public reasons denies that collective
decisions affecting the entire political community must treat all citizens
equally. Even in a morally diverse society such as our own, the value of
political equality is considered self-evident. At least symbolically, the right
to vote is the most important element of equal citizenship in America." 5
Extending the franchise, over time, has contributed to the notions that
political equality lies at the core of our democratic ideal, and that any
society denying a competent person an equal voice in public affairs is not
a democracy at all. Franchise extension illuminates the reason why Rawls
claims that public reason derives "from a conception of democratic
citizenship in a constitutional democracy."' 86 For Rawls, the possession of
the two moral powers--"the capacity to have and act from a sense of
justice, and the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the
good"--confers the status of equal citizenship." 7 This status, in turn,
cannot be taken away simply by a majority vote or on account of morally
arbitrary factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religious
affiliation, or property ownership. As long as a person possesses these
powers to a minimal degree, he or she has a right to an equal share of
coercive political power and a right to be treated by others in a way that
respects these powers.
'83 Its criterion of reciprocity also precludes premises that are grounded
exclusively in the alleged truth of secular comprehensive doctrines such as
utilitarianism, feminism, Marxism, libertarianism, and perfectionist varieties of
liberalism, see id. § 7.1, at 176.
184 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 219.
185 See GUINIER, supra note 115, at xiii; JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 2 (1999).
186 See Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, at 136.
'
8 7 See S.A. Lloyd, Relativizing Rawls, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 709, 715 (1994).
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I. CITIZENS AS JUDGES
A. The Analogy
This section will spell out the analogy between good Rawlsian
citizenship and good judging in some detail, explaining how public reason
might operate. This account is designed to give a more concrete idea of
how citizens with the right kind of motivation might approach their most
important voting decisions. 88 As legislators, 89 citizens must think like
judges legislating on a constrained basis. The duality is between our judge-
like role as citizens governing ourselves within the limits of public reason,
and our private lives, in which we live according to the full moral or
religious truth as we see it.' 90
As we saw in the last section, Rawls fears that the existence of moral
pluralism may prevent reasonable citizens from convincing the members of
their political community that the arguments that justify their collective
decisions on constitutional essentials are sound. This problem is remark-
ably similar to that of the legitimacy of judicial review, inasmuch as the
legal reasons that support legitimate constitutional decisions are widely
acknowledged in the constitutional culture--that is, reasons that are found
in the Constitution itself or based on a reasonable inference from the text.
For Rawls, though, the task of public justification is considerably more
complicated under conditions of moral pluralism because what counts as
a good argument, or even what counts as a good reason, may be contested.
At the very least, public justification is supposed to produce reasons that
dissenters could not reasonably reject.' This concern about meeting the
188 This argument assumes that most citizens of normal intelligence could
attempt to apply norms of public reason to real constitutional essentials in good
faith. It does not offer ideas about the kinds of constitutional or institutional
reforms that might be appropriate. That is a very important practical question, to
be left to another day. This Article solely puts forth a more democratic alternative
to judicial review on conceptual and normative grounds.
189 As "legislators," we are supposed to hold our elected representatives to the
standards of public reason.
190 I owe this phrasing to Andrew Lister, a friend of mine who read a rough
draft of this Article and made this suggestion.
191 The concept of "rejectability" is attributable to T.M. Scanlon. As he
explains, "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be
disallowed by any system of rules for the regulation of behaviour which no one
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement." T.M.
Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILrrARIANISM AND BEYOND I 10,
110 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1984).
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minimal requirements of justification is not skeptical in the sense of
assuming that moral propositions cannot be true or false or that such
propositions can only be true relative to a particular time and place. Instead,
it is premised on the inherent difficulty in particular cases of putting
together an argument about public morality that would persuade all
reasonable persons who already are divided over the nature of the human
good.
As a solution to this problem of political legitimacy, Rawls appeals to
our political heritage as the source of our shared public morality.'92
Roughly, the constraints of Rawlsian public reason parallel those of
principled constitutional adjudication and are designed to produce popular
consensus on constitutional essentials. The widespread practice of public
reason would reduce the need for courts to serve as forums of principle in
our constitutional democracy. Citizens who vote sincerely according to the
balance of public reasons could take the place of judges in deciding
constitutional essentials that do not require technical legal knowledge. '93 As
a result, democratic decisionmaking could be both participatory and
principled, producing democratically legitimate and morally acceptable
outcomes.'94 Such outcomes would be preferable to morally acceptable yet
democratically illegitimate outcomes on the one hand, and to morally
objectionable yet democratically legitimate outcomes on the other hand.
Rawls himself holds up ideal judicial practice as a model of the sort of
self-restraint that he anticipates on the part of citizens when they aim for
public justification:
Public reason sees the office of citizen with its duty of civility as
analogous to that of judgeship with its duty of deciding cases. Just as
judges are to decide them by legal grounds of precedent and recognized
192 But see Kurt Baier, Justice and the Aims of Political Philosophy, 99 ETHICS
771, 790 (1989) (concluding that "[o]ur existing constitutional consensus would
seem to be sufficient for stable social unity").
193 Cf Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1717, 1726-31 (1988) (contending that hard cases, which are the kinds of cases that
appellate judges are most likely to review, are less likely to require conventional
legal expertise for their resolution).
'94 Other things -equal, collective decisions on the most important political
questions ought to be fair in the sense that all reasonable people would accept, or
at least understand, their underlying reasons and ought to be democratically
legitimate--i.e., actually be endorsed by real citizens. On the importance of
democratic legitimacy, see Christopher Bertram, PoliticalJustification, Theoretical
Complexity, and Democratic Community, 107 ETHICS 563 (1997).
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canons of statutory interpretation and other relevant grounds, so citizens
are to reason by public reason and to be guided by the criterion of
reciprocity, Whenever constitutional essentials and matters ofbasic justice
are at stake.' 95
The idea is something like this: when a judge tries to answer a question of
constitutional law in good faith, he or she looks to the text of the Constitu-
tion and perhaps to external sources that have added interpretive gloss over
time. The judge is committed to interpreting the text-applying its
principles or rules to the particular facts of the case in front of him or
her-independently of his or her deeper moral, religious, or particular
convictions and of the judge's intense desire for a particular outcome on
non-legal grounds. Indeed, this psychological supposition is central to the
possibility of principled legal reasoning more generally.
Similarly, for the citizen who thinks of him or herself as a judge, the
values of our-political heritage are to serve as the case law informing the
citizen's judgments concerning fundamental political questions. Just as
courts preserve their legitimacy in a constitutional democracy by exercising
the power of judicial review responsibly, citizens are to take their-duty of
civility to comply with the norms of public reason equally seriously. This
commitment does not mean that citizens who are sincerely committed to
public reason will never reach different decisions, particularly in hard cases
that may be factually complex. Nothing rules out the possibility that
citizens with the best of intentions may make interpretive mistakes. In very
hard cases, moreover, there may not be a right or an obviously better
answer even after citizens have narrowed down their choices to a number
of possibilities.'96 There will be difficult choices at the margins and
reasonable people may reach different, but equally plausible,
conclusions.'9 7 It is widely recognized that a general principle of law--or
any general political or moral principle for that matter--may be under-
determined when it must be applied to a concrete set of facts. 9 ' Similarly,
'9 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at Iv.
196 Ronald Dworkin is famous for holding the view that there are right answers
(those that fit better) even in hard cases. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,
supra note 39.
Conflicts arising from the burdens of judgment always limit the extent of
possible agreement even among reasonable persons. See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS, supra note 28, at 35-37; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28,
at 54-58; Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 28, 'at 177.
198 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 13, at 739-41; Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy,
77 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1989).
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legal conclusions do not simply follow deductively from legal premises.' 9
Nevertheless, even though we cannot expect unanimity in hard cases,
citizens must try to reach conclusions that aspire to public justification.
At the very least, the analogy between citizens and judges is suggestive.
It gives us another way to think about citizenship in a deliberative,
constitutional democracy that is more principled and less hostile to actual
moral argumentation among citizens themselves. Equally importantly, the
Rawlsian conception of citizenship in which citizens assume a judge-like
role does not commit the error of reducing democracy to crude majority
rule with insufficient attention to the public good. The idea of citizens as
judges captures the reasonable attitude (or the moral psychology) that a
Rawlsian citizen has when his or her vote on a constitutional essential may
create a public law that coerces others.200 A judge or citizen can accept this
dual identity without becoming morally schizophrenic. It is not inconceiv-
able, for instance, for a judge to believe that abortion or affirmative action
is morally wrong on personal grounds and nevertheless believe that the
Constitution permits the practice, or conversely, that abortion is morally
permissible but not protected by a right of privacy specified in the
Constitution. In fact, this possibility is what we would expect from
someone whose highest duty requires him or her to base his or her legal
decisions on principled reasons that can be justified to others who do not
share his or her deeper beliefs. At best, the final decision is the product of
thoughtful, principled deliberation and as such, is as legitimate as possible
in an imperfect world.2 '
B. Egalitarian Implications
As we saw earlier, defenders of the power of judicial review contend
that its exercise is a necessary evil in a democracy where most citizens are
199 The difficulties of formalism are well known. For a more nuanced
conception of formalism, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509
(1988).
200 Cf Wechsler, supra note 33, at 15-19.
20 As Thomas Nagel puts it:
The pure ideal of political legitimacy is that the use of state power
should be capable of being authorized by each citizen--not in direct detail
but through acceptance of the principles, institutions, and procedures which
determine how that power will be used. This requires the possibility of
unanimous agreement at some sufficiently high level, for if there are
citizens who can legitimately object to the way state power is used against
them or in their name, the state is not legitimate.
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 8 (1991).
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poorly informed and take very little interest in public affairs. Such judicial
oversight cannot be avoided, theyallege, because the people or their elected
representatives will make rash and often foolish judgments on important
political questions that ought to be a product of careful, principled
deliberation. °2 Nevertheless, such a purportedly realistic solution, as this
Article has shown, has serious normative difficulties of its own. Resolving
our most difficult political differences through litigation in forums that are
opaque to most citizens is problematic. °3 Can we claim in good faith that
citizens are ruling themselves if they do not grasp more of the details of
how controversies of public morality are resolved in their name? It is a bit
disturbing that the vast majority of citizens in the United States could not
understand the legal reasoning that determined the outcome of their most
recent presidential election, leading to allegations that one side had "stolen"
the election.
At minimum, understanding how a democracy settles conflicts over
rights, duties, and the distribution of scarce resources should be common
knowledge. The scope of judicial review could be drastically reduced, as
I have argued above, if citizens could act more like judges or indeed, if they
were trusted with some degree of minimal civic responsibility in the first
place. For this reason, it is worth exploring a model of citizenship based on
Rawlsian public reason that resembles the way in which judges ought to
make legal decisions. Civic reasoning according to the constraints of public
reason eventually might be able to replace judicial review on questions of
public morality provided that real citizens were willing and able to apply
its norms to real constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice
competently. One of our primary aims should be to formulate an inclusive
mode of deliberation that makes room for serious moral argumentation but
that also requires real citizens, rather than judges, to express the constitu-
tional will of the people. As such, citizens would share coercive political
power equally.
C. The Accessibility of Public Reasons
One could object that such a legalistic paradigm of civic reasoning
would make unreasonable demands of ordinary citizens. Indeed, this charge
is so common that it prematurely cuts off serious discussion of alternative
models of democracy that are less fixated on courts and more open to
202 See, e.g., supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
203 On public ignorance of the operation of the court system, see POSNER, supra
note 24, at 136 n.23.
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citizen participation. Rawlsian public reason would not be seen as so
unrealistically utopian if our society were more willing to educate all of its
citizens in the basic aspects of democratic citizenship and to devote social
resources to this end. Civic education could focus on developing the
deliberative skills that would close the gap between the ideal of public
reason and its practice over time. We do not expect ordinary citizens, of
course, to become philosopher-kings. But we already allow them to serve
on juries and to vote. Thus, it is not as if we have never trusted citizens
with any kind of real power. One of the advantages of civic reasoning and
voting according to the constraints of public reason is that it is likely to be
less exclusionary than richer deliberation based on deeper legal or moral
argumentation would be. The ultimate goal would be for the vast majority
of citizens to practice public reason competently and thus, render democrat-
ically legitimate decisions.2 4
At the very least, public reason is more likely to be accessible to a wide
audience of different educational levels. It might also encourage ordinary
citizens to take public affairs more seriously.2 °5 As John Stuart Mill once
argued, our involvement in deliberation and decisions concerning the public
good develops our reasoning capacities and broadens our interests beyond
our own concerns, leading us to take an interest in others.2.6 As Cass
Sunstein points out, our preoccupation with the role of the courts in the
American constitutional system is at odds with the equally important civic
republican tradition that emphasizes active political participation and
concern for the public good.207 For these reasons, it is imperative to create
a public of more thoughtful citizens who can apply public reason to real
fundamental political questions.
204 Rawls states, "Political values alone.., are to settle who has the right to
vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of
opportunity, or to hold property." RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 28,
at 214.
205 Cf. FISHKIN, supra note 78, at 20.
206 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1864).
207 SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 9. See generally
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Suzanna Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 U. VA. L.
REV. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 29 (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communi-
tarian Debate, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 181-203 (1995).
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Our acceptance of judicial review as an insurance policy against
majoritarian excess discourages us from thinking about how we might
realistically bring politics and principled deliberation together. This is the
main point of this Article. Public deliberation and voting according to
Rawlsian public reason constitute the minimal moral conversation that
deliberative democracy requires. The practice of public reason by ordinary
citizens would enable them to take responsibility for the choices that
otherwise would be made only in their name. For far too long, we have
given judges the power to make decisions that citizens should be able to
make on their own. Without an opportunity to learn how to vote appropri-
ately, citizens will never learn to rule themselves.20 8 Under such circum-
stances, we should not be surprised that many citizens take little interest in
politics.
The "shallow reasons" that count as good public reasons form one of
the greatest virtues of public reason, because this quality can reduce the
historical tension between popular participation and the quality of
deliberation.2 9 If deliberative agreement among real citizens is necessary
to produce legitimate decisions, the practice of public reason cannot be
limited to those who have specialized academic or professional training. At
the same time, the "shallow" aspects of public reason, like constitutional
values, are sufficiently moral in that they treat all members of the political
community with equal concern and respect. In this way, good reasons will
guide voting behavior and generate legitimate public laws. The Madisonian
model of democracy, which has exerted so much influence over our
collective imagination, assumes the realm of politics to be an arena of
interest group pluralism, coalition-building, bargaining, and compromises.
Those who believe that democratic politics should be more principled are
often attacked for their purported ignorance of political history, political
institutions, and real world considerations more generally. This apparent
split between politics and principle, however, prevents us from seeing the
208 On the difficulties of inculcating liberal civic virtues such as tolerance in
children whose parents are deeply religious, see Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic
Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?, 105
ETHICS 468 (1995).
209 I borrow the term "shallow reasons" from S.A. Lloyd. Lloyd, supra note
188, at 718. Cass Sunstein makes the same point when he suggests that "low-level
explanations," or a relatively modest rationale, may be sufficient in commanding
agreement from a diverse people. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note
7, at 14. Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson argue that "citizens should seek the
rationale that minimizes rejection of the position they oppose." See GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 121, at 84-85.
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possibility of a more deliberative political existence where courts are not
the only forums for principled argumentation.21
Tying justification to the everyday practice of exchanging reasons
among ordinary citizens is central to a move away from placing our faith
in judges toward true democratic self-rule in which citizens make choices
about public morality based on reasons that are widely accessible.21" As
such, the gap between theoretical and publicly accessible reasons can be
closed, allowing ordinary citizens to understand the reasons that underlie
the laws that they themselves are supposed to legislate. As Jeremy Waldron
puts it:
Society should be a transparent order, in the sense that its workings and
principles should be well-known and available for public apprehension
and scrutiny. People should know and understand the reasons for the
basic distribution of wealth, power, authority, and freedom. Society
should not be shrouded in mystery, and its workings should not have to
depend on mythology, mystification, or a "noble lie."
212
Indeed, in a democracy, that a reason or argument is too complex to be
understood by the vast majority of the population counts as a strong reason
against using it as a means of public justification. All other things equal,
and assuming reasonable levels of education and attention, we ought to
prefer reasons that are widely accessible to reasons that only can be
understood by a minority of highly educated citizens. After all, people
210 This thought is not as counterintuitive as it may initially sound because in
most other non-political spheres, we expect good reasons to guide practical
reasoning, and we reject the claim that any reason whatsoever counts as a sufficient
reason for an action. For example, most of us would not allow a fellow juror to
explain his or her vote to convict a defendant in a criminal trial on the grounds that
an African-American is more likely to be a criminal. This reason, based on racial
prejudice, would be unacceptable. We would ask such a juror for better reasons to
support his or her belief in the defendant's guilt and if he or she could not produce
them, we would demand that he or she change his or her vote.
21 Earlier, in A Theory ofJustice, Rawls acknowledged this potential problem:
"[A] conception ofjustice is to be the public basis of the terms of social coopera-
tion. Since common understanding necessitates certain bounds on the complexity
of principles, there may likewise be limits on the use of theoretical knowledge in
the original position." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 142 (1971).
212 JEREMY WALDRON, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, in LIBERAL
RIGHTS COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 58 (1993) (quoting PLATO, THE
REPUBLIC, Bk. III (414B)).
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cannot accept a reason if they cannot understand it. Reasons that can be
comprehended only by philosophers, lawyers, and economists occupy an
awkward spot in a democracy because ordinary citizens, on their own, must
accept them freely. If these reasons are only dimly understood or not
comprehended at all, we cannot really say that we have respected the
autonomy of each citizen, that is, his or her capacity to understand and
accept reasons that are supposed to guide his or her actions. When we do
not treat citizens in this way, we do not treat them with equal concern and
respect.
This publicity requirement-that for public reasons to have real
justifying force they must be sufficiently accessible-raises a difficult
question about what kinds of reasons ought to be excluded on the ground
that they are too complex to be comprehended by an adult citizen of
average intelligence. This Article cannot address this matter. To be sure,
there is room for debate concerning whether a particular reason or
argument falls on one side of the line or on the other side. The point is that
in the end, to legitimate public law, the reasons offered must not only be
fair to all of those who are affected, but must also be as transparent as
possible to ensure that citizens do not simply defer to other citizens who
purport to be experts.
Allowing citizens to vote merely on the basis of their personal
preferences, as many democratic critics of judicial review would have us
do, does not expose the important political issues to adequate moral
scrutiny. At the very least, citizens in a democracy should be able to
explain their vote with some appreciation for its potential effects on other
members of the political community. After all, aggregations of votes
determine who will have the power to make decisions that have far-
reaching domestic, and sometimes global, ramifications. The reasons that
citizens provide need not be sophisticated, but they ought to be minimally
moral and based on facts. In other words, the moral reasons offered to
justify public law ought to legitimize what otherwise would be unjustified
coercion. They must be fair to everyone in the sense of being sufficiently
respectful of the right of each citizen to formulate and pursue his or her
own morally permissible ends. Even when sincere deliberators cannot reach
consensus in hard cases, a vote that takes place after such deliberation is
much more likely to be legitimate in the eyes of deliberators who have been
exposed to all of the relevant arguments and who have had a real opportu-
nity to be heard.
The process of exchanging good-faith reasons to make principled
collective decisions can generate public opinion based on a thoughtful
appraisal of political options, rather than based on cues from the mass
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media and from special interests. Creating participatory conditions that are
more conducive to civic learning calls for a more cooperative, less
antagonistic style of collective decisionmaking that eschews the kind of
politics that merely advance individual interests or parochial ideals without
proper consideration of the freedom and equality of others. In a democracy,
it matters not only whether the outcomes are fair or just, but also how
political conflicts are resolved. These collective decisions affect the lives
of too many people to be made in a way inaccessible to the majority of
ordinary citizens. The case for Rawlsian public reason as an alternative to
judicial review turns on the degree to which public deliberation can
constrain how citizens vote on fundamental political questions. The reasons
that guide a citizen's decision! must be consistent with treating other
citizens as political equals and tolerating, if not respecting, their reasonable
life plans. In sum, the practice of public reason by citizens is preferable to
the exercise ofjudicial review by unelected judges because citizens should
be trusted with the civic responsibility of making their own collective
decisions.
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages, this Article argued that voting on the basis of
Rawlsian public reason should take the place of judicial review on
questions of public morality, thereby avoiding the troubling antidemocratic
implications ofjudicial supremacy. The point was not to attack the concept
ofjudicial review-or at least not the "review" part-but rather to explain
how something like judicial review could be practiced more democratically
by citizens when they make decisions for the entire political community.
The apparent dilemma between the exercise ofjudicial review by unelected
judges on the one hand and unconstrained majoritarian rule by the public
on the other hand, then, disappears. Indeed, the parallel between judicial
review and public reason deserves to be examined in much greater detail,
because their functions in a constitutional democracy have remarkably
similar normative justifications. Both operate to constrain democratic
decisionmaking to protect higher law. The most obvious advantage of the
practice of public reason is that it minimizes the need for judicial incur-
sions into the democratic space, allowing ordinary people to have more
direct control over their own lives.
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23 As J.B. Thayer wrote:
[I]t should be remembered that the exercise of [the power of judicial
review], even when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil,
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At the same time, without question, the requirements of public reason
put a great deal of civic responsibility on the shoulders of ordinary citizens.
They cannot ignore reasonable dissenters but must justify their votes on
constitutional essentials to them. In doing so, I claimed that it would be
useful for them to think of themselves as judges before they cast their
ballots. Just as judicial integrity requires judges to apply the law in good
faith, the civic duty of Rawlsian citizens demands that they employ the
same sort of self-restraint, allowing the balance of public reasons, as
opposed to their deeper religious or moral convictions, to guide their voting
decisions. Such reasons parallel good constitutional reasons to the extent
that both classes of reasons are premised upon respect for political equality
and the freedom of individuals to pursue their respective conceptions of the
good. Those who seek to use the state to restrict this freedom must produce
sufficiently compelling reasons to overcome the strong presumption against
such uses of coercive political power. Reasons that fall short of this
standard-i.e., those than can be reasonably rejected by dissenters--cannot
legitimize legislation when fundamental political questions are at stake.214
In fact, the absence of such reasons puts into considerable doubt the moral
obligation of such persons to obey the law. From a practical standpoint,
furthermore, considerable empirical evidence suggests that people who
believe that the law is legitimate are more likely to comply with it.215 At the
very least, the right to coerce reasonable dissenters must be based on a
moral justification that has wide appeal under conditions of moral
pluralism.
The most honest rationale for the practice of judicial review today is
deep pessimism about the likelihood that ordinary citizens could ever come
namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside,
and the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral education
and stimulus that come from fighting the question out in the ordinary way,
and correcting their own errors....
The tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function, now
lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and
to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1901).
2"14 However, justification need not be addressed to unreasonable persons. On
this point, see Erin Kelly & Lionel McPherson, On Tolerating the Unreasonable,
9 J. POL. PHIL. 38 (2001).
215 Cf TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 7 (1990) (noting that some
studies show a link between compliance and confidence in the law's legitimacy, but
that the link is only "moderately strong," and little research has been done in this
area).
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to appreciate constitutional values or to apply them to particular cases.216
In this sense, many of us are still "reluctant" democrats who accept a sharp
distinction between democracy and constitutionalism. From this cynical
standpoint, judicial supremacy turns out to be the lesser of two evils: it is
appropriate in an imperfect world where the vast majority of citizens are
incapable of making informed, reflective decisions on basic questions of
public morality. This pessimism masks highly questionable optimism about
the likelihood that judges will do any better in terms of rising above
partisan politics in the defense of higher law. Simply put, this belief is
based too much on wishful thinking and too little on historical and
empirical evidence. More importantly, such pessimism prevents us from
exploring the possibility that the practice of constitutional review could be
made more democratic. Indeed, Americans are not hopelessly divided over
political morality, at least not at an abstract level.2"7 Excessive skepticism
about the capabilities of ordinary citizens discourages us from thinking
seriously about how we might bring the people and the Constitution closer
together. In the end, we ought not to settle so easily for a democracy in
which citizens are not trusted to rule themselves.
216 See Brest, supra note 64, at 1106.
217 See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL (1998).
